In Southeast Asia, the assumption of power by her administration has generated a lot of interest given the fact that Vice President Kamala Harris continues to stamp on U.S. foreign policy. This is a strategically diverse region and a Harris administration could usher in substantial shifts towards U.S.–Southeast Asia relations. Such moves include changes in trade, security, climate change cooperation, and diplomatic relations — all of which this article seeks to delve into further to give an idea of what Southeast Asia can expect should Harris ascend into the Oval Office.
Promote economic ties and agreements.
One of the issues in which we expect a Harris administration to spend some energy is improving trade relations between the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries. He has also stressed the importance of economic cooperation, noting that while the region remains a large source of trade for the United States countries, such as Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia play essential parts in worldwide supply chains. Lying at the crossroads of global capital and trade flows, Southeast Asia is a keystone economically for America.
Similarly, the previous Biden-Harris administration had promoted multilateral engagement by referencing the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). A Harris administration would only accelerate this effort, aiding economic resiliency when so many in ASEAN are fighting to wean themselves off what they see as excessive dependence on China. Mutual economic gains could also arise from broadening the US trade zones, specifically in technology, pharmaceuticals, and green energy.
Maintaining National Security and Defense Partnerships
Fueling competition in the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia has become more important for security reasons on a global scale. A Harris administration would return U.S. foreign policy in this region to the basics by reaffirming security partnerships and military alliances with key ASEAN members. Harris has already shown an interest in maintaining global norms and freedom of navigation in hotly contested waters.
Philippines and Vietnam, where Washington has been trying to forge closer defense ties to counter Chinese pressure over territorial disputes. One example could be a reinvigorated Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, and Harris would likely bring more U.S. troops to the region as well. Then again, stronger cooperation with ASEAN-led initiatives (including the ADMM-Plus) would help position the U.S. as a dependable security partner.
Climate Change and Environmental Cooperation
One area where Southeast Asia can benefit from deeper US collaboration is on climate change. The area is mostly under threat of the conjectural effects of climate change, as increased sea levels and extreme weather conditions along with deforestation are settling in to threaten biodiversity and the economy.
A Harris administration, for example, would certainly emphasize climate diplomacy as part of its wider diplomatic menu and likely work to nationalize policy across the region on environmental sustainability in this most globalized of areas. Harris has made climate change a big part of her rhetoric and is likely to be the US representative to regional programs such as the Paris Agreement and ASEANâ’s Action Plan on Climate Change. There might also be increased U.S. financing and technological assistance to support renewable energy projects in the region as part of an effort to push it toward a transition to a low-carbon economy.
Rights Connect (Human Rights and Democratic Governance)
Human rights and governance would be another pillar of U.S.-Southeast Asia relations under Harris. The region surrounding AFI’s headquarters is home to both highly controlled spaces like Singapore and Vietnam, where even the hint of political expression can land you in jail, and more vibrant democracies like Indonesia and the Philippines. The continuing challenge of Indonesia.
Harris, a champion of human rights can take Southeast Asian governments to task over democratic principles. She will advocate for freedom of speech, political transparency, and the rights of marginalized communities as part of U.S. diplomacy. Nations such as Myanmar, where a military coup has spurred significant worry about democratic backsliding, could find themselves targeted by the Harris administration with aggressive sanctions and backing of democrat movements.
In Search of an Equitable Middle Path for the US Rebalancing towards Southeast Asia in Light of China
Balancing power with China, in the context of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia, is crucial. China has gained pre-eminence in the economic sphere and the United States in military and diplomatic terms since at least the days of Henry Kissinger’s “ping pong diplomacy” with Chairman Mao.
Under a Harris administration, we could see a more nuanced approach to the region that supports U.S. engagement while avoiding catastrophic crises with China. Harris could, for instance, double down on countervailing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia by offering an alternative source of infrastructure funding to countries that might be concerned about over-reliance on investments from Beijing.
But Harris could also be partial to dialogue and diplomacy vis-a-vis China, attending to the country in multilateral bodies while dealing with trade imbalances, cyber security, and environmental concerns. The end game is ultimately aimed at keeping Southeast Asia out of the line of fire in the U.S.-China competition and at anchoring a strong U.S. presence remains to resist Chinese pushiness in the region.
Some clear areas where the Council could influence discussions this year include public health and pandemic preparedness.
Preexisting global health vulnerabilities were exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Southeast Asia was no exception to this trend. In light of the region’s experiences with SARS, COVID-19, and other infectious diseases, a Harris administration in particular could be instrumental in improving global health security cooperation.
Such a shift in emphasis on the public health response to Malaria and other diseases might for example see Harris scale up projects in disease surveillance, vaccination campaigns, or improvements in health infrastructure across Southeast Asia through programs like the U.S. President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), etc. Better cooperation among U.S. health agencies and the countries of ASEAN could increase the region’s capacity to respond to public health emergencies in the future as well.
If a Biden-Harris administration is elected, it could offer a reset to U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, pivoting towards economic cooperation, security partnerships, climate change, and human rights and public health issues. By addressing them, ASEAN might become a more dynamic and resilient global partner. The real question is, how will Southeast Asian countries sustain this relationship in line with these evolving dynamics between the U.S. and China? Regardless, it is likely that a Harris-led administration will treat Southeast Asia as an important front in U.S. foreign policy.
